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Abstract
We follow the method for the speciﬁcation and analysis of protocols introduced
in [3], further exploiting the capabilities of Maude. Our speciﬁcations are highly
structured and allow the detection of type ﬂaws, as well as replay attacks. We
describe a variation of the search strategy introduced in [3] that supports two kinds
of optimizations in a simple and modular way.
1 Introduction
Many researchers are using formal methods to analyze security protocols. The
approaches used include state-space exploration, belief logics and the use of
theorem provers. Still the veriﬁcation and development of security proto-
cols continues to be a challenge. Denker, Meseguer and Talcott demonstrate
in [3] how Maude can be used to formalize the speciﬁcation and analysis of
cryptographic protocols. In a detailed case study of the Needham-Schroeder
public-key protocol they present an object-oriented speciﬁcation of the proto-
col and describe how its execution can be used for simulation and debugging
purposes. The analysis of the correctness of the protocol also requires the
formalization of the malicious environment and what constitutes a violation
of its security goals. They show how the state space of the full speciﬁcation
of the protocol and its environment can be explored in a systematic way in
search of security violations.
We have followed their method and further explored the combination of
rewrite rules, pattern matching, mixﬁx notation, subsort structure, overload-
ing, object-orientation, inheritance and the module algebra that Maude pro-
vides in the speciﬁcation of four benchmark cryptographic protocols: the
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Needham-Schroeder public key authentication protocol, the Otway-Rees pro-
tocol, the Woo-Lam Π authentication protocol and the Woo-Lam mutual au-
thentication protocol.
Our speciﬁcations are highly structured and not only allow the discovery
of replay attacks, but also of type ﬂaws. Lowe describes in [6] how Casper
requires guesswork in giving multiple types to data types in order to have a
good chance of ﬁnding a type ﬂaw. We show how the Maude sort structure
allows a very natural way of representing data that requires no guesswork.
In Section 2 we describe the model we use in the speciﬁcation of proto-
cols taking as an example parts of the speciﬁcation of the Woo-Lam mutual
authentication protocol. In Section 3 we describe the model for an intruder
and discuss the need for protocol-speciﬁc intruders. Section 4 discusses the
kinds of attacks we have considered. Section 5 describes a variation of the
search in [3] and how it allows for optimizations. Section 6 discusses what
those optimizations have been in our analysis of protocols.
2 Protocol Speciﬁcation
Cryptographic protocols are designed to establish security properties in dis-
tributed communications. They are informally speciﬁed as sequences of mes-
sages exchanged between participants in such communications. Often infor-
mal arguments about their correctness have proved to be inadequate, failing
to detect some of their ﬂaws.
Denker, Meseguer and Talcott demonstrate in [3] how Maude can be used
to formally specify and analyze cryptographic protocols. To be able to sub-
ject a protocol to formal analysis, its formal speciﬁcation must formalize the
informal one, the environment against which it is to guarantee the security
property, which is embodied in the notion of intruder, and what constitutes a
violation of the guaranteed security property, that is, an attack on the proto-
col.
Maude is an executable logical language that implements rewriting logic,
a logic for reasoning about concurrent change. In this logic a concurrent
system is speciﬁed by a rewrite theory, which consists of an algebraic data
type to specify the state space of the system, and a set of rewrite rules to
specify the dynamics of the system. In Maude a rewrite theory becomes a
system module or an object-oriented module, which is a special kind of system
module whose syntax supports the speciﬁcation of object systems. Maude
provides many features for the construction of highly structured modules. In
our speciﬁcations we have exploited inheritance, subsorts and parameterized
modules, as well as the expressiveness allowed by pattern matching, mixﬁx
notation and overloading.
The global state of a system engaged in the execution of a cryptographic
protocol is composed of the local state of each of its participants and the
messages in transit. This is represented as a multiset of objects and messages,
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Fig. 1. Sort structure for the protocol messages.
that is, as a conﬁguration deﬁned by a Maude object-oriented module.
A protocol message is a sequence of bits, which the protocol prescribes as
a list of message components. Some common components are ids of princi-
pals, nonces, which are numbers uniquely identifying an instantiation of the
protocol, and keys. Sorts describing protocol messages are given in Figure 1.
Bits and lists of components can be concatenated and bits can be encrypted.
(Below underscores mark the position of the arguments.)
op _‘,_ : Bits Bits -> Bits [assoc] .
op _‘,_ : MsgCompList+ MsgCompList+ -> MsgCompList+ [assoc] .
op ‘{_‘}_ : Bits EncryptingKey -> MsgComp .
All participants in the protocol, referred to as principals, share the ability
to exchange messages, which is deﬁned by the following class.
class Principal .
msg from_to_send_ : PrincipalId PrincipalId ProtocolMsg
-> NetworkMsg .
PrincipalId and NetworkMsg are subsorts, respectively, of Oid and Msg,
which are introduced in the system module CONFIGURATION, upon which Maude’s
object-oriented modules are implicitly built. ProtocolMsg, a supersort of
Bits that has no concatenation, is the sort for the body of a message.
A principal in a given instantiation or run of the protocol may play one
of several roles: initiator or responder, the roles of a proper principal, or
the role of a trusted server with knowledge of long-term keys, which for key-
distribution protocols must also generate session keys. The intruder is also a
principal; not only is it capable of surreptitious behavior, but may participate
as a proper principal. Figure 2 shows the class structure for the principals of
a protocol. Class AllAgents has as its attribute the set of the ids of all the
principals, representing the fact that ids are public knowledge.
A proper principal may participate in several concurrent runs, playing
either the initiator or the responder role. A server may play only the server
role. The local state of a principal reﬂects the progress of all concurrent runs
in which the principal is participating. It is composed of states describing the
progress of each run. For each step of the protocol the object representing
a principal has one or more corresponding attributes. These are sets with
one element per run currently at that step. Each element is a tuple whose
3
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Fig. 2. Class structure for the modelling and analysis of cryptographic protocols.
components are decorated with symbols. # precedes a nonce; * precedes a
principal id, and & a key. o stands for “other” and m, for “mine”. It represents
the knowledge accumulated by the principal up to that step of the run.
Consider the Woo and Lam’s protocol shown in Figure 3, which combines
mutual authentication and key distribution. A proper principal of this proto-
col is modelled by the following class.
class WooLamMA-Principal |
server’s-key : SymmetricKey,
count : MachineInt,
desired-runs : Set[WooLamMA-PrincipalId],
started-runs? : Set[Other&MyNonce],
responder-runs? : Set[OtherItsNonce&MyNonce],
initiator-runs? : Set[OtherItsNonce&MyNonce],
msg-to-server : Set[OtherItsNonce&MyNonce],
authenticated-ids : Set[OtherItsNonce&MyNonce],
unchecked-run-keys : Set[OtherItsNonce&OurKey],
established-runs : Set[RoleOtherItsNonceMyNonce&OurKey] .
subclass WooLamMA-Principal < Principal .
server’s-key is the symmetric key the principal shares with the key dis-
tribution server, while count is an integer counter used for the symbolic rep-
resentation of fresh nonces. The rest of the attributes deﬁne the state of runs
at each of the steps in which an initiator or a responder may take part.
Rewrite rules describe the state transitions as messages are sent and re-
ceived. The pattern for an n-message protocol consists of a rule send-1 to
describe the initiation of the protocol as the ﬁrst message is sent, a rule get-n
describing the reception of the last message, and rules get-k-send-k+ 1, for
k = 1, . . . , n− 1, to describe the rest of the protocol. Each rule describes how
the local state of a principal changes as it receives or sends protocol messages.
The initial state of a run for the initiator is given by an element (of the
set for) desired-runs, the id of the party or agent with which it wishes to
communicate. As the initiator sends Message 1 this run enters a state repre-
sented by an element of started-runs?, which consists of the id of the other
and the nonce sent in Message 1. Thus, the change of the local state of the
initiator is represented by the removal of an element from desired-runs and
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Message 1. A→ B : A,Na
Message 2. B → A : B,Nb
Message 3. A→ B : {A,B,Na,Nb}Kas
Message 4. B → S : {A,B,Na,Nb}Kas, {A,B,Na,Nb}Kbs
Message 5. S → B : {B,Na,Nb,Kab}Kas, {A,Na,Nb,Kab}Kbs
Message 6. B → A : {B,Na,Nb,Kab}Kas, {Na,Nb}Kab
Message 7. A→ B : {Nb}Kab
Fig. 3. Woo and Lam mutual authentication protocol.
the addition of a new element to started-runs?. As long as the respon-
der receives a message with the format prescribed for Message 1, it accepts
the message, responds with Message 2 and enters the state represented by
an element of responder-runs?, which contains the data gathered from the
message received and included in the message sent, that is, the id and nonce
received from the initiator and the nonce sent to it.
Figure 4 shows the sequence of run states for a given instantiation of the
protocol. States of the initiator are labelled by α’s, those of the responder by
β’s and that of the key distribution server by a γ. A KeyDistrServer has
two attributes, a set of long-term keys, which is independent of any run, and
session-keys, a set whose elements uniquely identify session keys the server
has generated. One state precedes another if it is reached before the other.
Figure 5 shows the state transitions described by the rewrite rules.
A rewrite rule has the form r : t→ t′, where r labels the rule, and t and t′
are terms describing fragments of the state of the system. In our example, the
rules describing the protocol have left-hand terms consisting of an incoming
message, if any, and an object representing the principal receiving it. Right-
hand terms consist of an object describing the new state of this principal, and
the outgoing message, if any.
A given protocol message appears in two rules — the one describing the
local state transition of the sender as it sends the message, and the other
describing the transition of the recipient upon receiving it. The same message
component may be represented diﬀerently in these two rules. It is represented
by a term of least sort appropriate for it (see Fig 1) in a rule in which the
sender has just created it. In a message being received, or a message being
sent that is forwarding it, a variable of sort Bits represents it. This is to allow
for misinterpretation of the contents of the message, which is a vulnerability
of some protocols referred to as a type ﬂaw.
There is one exception to this convention. To subvert protocols intrud-
ers send counterfeit messages composed from components of authentic ones.
In trying to exploit type ﬂaws such messages may try to pass one kind of
5
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αO desired-runs : B
α1 started-runs? : o* B m# Na
βO responder-runs? : o* A o# Na m# Nb
α2 initiator-runs? : o* B o# Nb m# Na
β1 msg-to-server : o* A o# Na m# Nb
γO session-keys : [A, B] (Na # Nb) Kab
β2 authenticated-ids : o* A o# Na m# Nb
unchecked-run-keys : o* A o# Na & Kab
α3 established-runs : initiator o* B o# Nb m# Na & Kab
β3 established-runs : responder o* A o# Na m# Nb & Kab
Fig. 4. Sequence of run states.
A B S
α0
send-1↓
α1 msg1 msg1
↓ get-1-send-2
α1 msg2 msg2 βO
get-2-send-3↓
α2 msg3 msg3 βO
↓ get-3-send-4
β1 msg4 msg4
↓ get-4-send-5
β1 msg5 msg5 γO
↓ get-5-send-6
α2 msg6 msg6 β2
get-6-send-7↓
α3 msg7 msg7 β2
↓ get-7
β3
Fig. 5. State transitions.
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component for another. Since principal ids are public knowledge, however,
an intruder is always able to use whichever id serves its purposes whenever
a protocol message requires a principal id. Thus, principal ids are always
represented by terms of the appropriate id sort.
To interpret the bits received interpretation operators for the various sorts
for components are introduced. For example,
op _>nonce : Bits -> Nonce .
op _>e-key : Bits -> EncryptingKey .
In the absence of type ﬂaws expressions should be simpliﬁed.
var N : Nonce . eq N >nonce = N .
var EK : EncryptingKey . eq EK >e-key = EK .
We illustrate the use of these conventions with a couple of rules They also
show Maude’s convention that a rule need not mention attributes of an object
that are irrelevant for that rule. Variable declarations are omitted. Identiﬁers
beginning with B, other than B, are variables of sort Bits.
crl [get-1-send-2] :
[ Conf
< B : WooLamMA-Principal |
count : C,
started-runs? : SRs,
initiator-runs? : IRs,
established-runs : ERs,
responder-runs? : RRs >
from A to B send A, Bs ]
=> [ Conf
< B : WooLamMA-Principal |
count : C + 1,
responder-runs? :
(o* A o# (Bs >nonce) m# nonce(B, C)) U RRs >
from B to A send B, nonce(B, C) ]
if not (A in SRs or A in IRs or A in ERs) .
Note that Message 1 and Message 2 in Figure 3 have the same form. In
order to diﬀerentiate one from the other we have imposed the condition that a
principal will take the role of responder only if it has not previously initiated
a run with the other principal.
The transition caused by the reception of Message 5 is described by the
following rule. Decryption is represented by pattern matching.
crl [get-5-send-6] :
[ Conf
< B : WooLamMA-Principal |
server’s-key : Kbs,
msg-to-server : (o* A o# Na m# Nb) U MtSs,
authenticated-ids : AIds,
unchecked-run-keys : UKs >
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from S to B send Bs, {A, Bna, Bnb, Bk}Kbs ]
=> [ Conf
< B : WooLamMA-Principal |
msg-to-server : MtSs,
authenticated-ids : (o* A o# Na m# Nb) U AIds,
unchecked-run-keys : (o* A o# Na & Bk >s-key) U UKs >
from B to A send Bs, {Na, Nb} Bk >s-key ]
if Bna >nonce == Na and Bnb >nonce == Nb .
3 Intruders
An intruder represents the malicious environment in which a protocol is to
guarantee some security property. It subverts the goals of the protocol through
the manipulation of messages. We model it by the following class.
class Intruder |
msgs-by-others : FlaggedProtocolMsgs,
fake-msgs : Set[ProtocolMsg],
dummy-msgs : Set[Bits],
new-components : Set[MsgComp],
old-components : Set[MsgComp] .
A few rules describe behavior that is common to any intruder. get-msg
intercepts authentic messages, which become members of msgs-by-others.
They may be replayed by replay-msg, possibly impersonating a diﬀerent
sender and directed to a diﬀerent recipient. They may also serve as a source
of components from which the intruder composes counterfeit messages, which
are sent by send-msg. The protocols in msgs-by-others have ﬂags to indicate
whether a message has been decomposed. The components obtained from
the decomposition of a message become members of new-components. Any
intruder also can send dummy messages, which are sent by send-dummy-msg.
An intruder has knowledge of the particular protocol, since it can partic-
ipate as a proper principal. Thus, it is fully speciﬁed by a protocol-speciﬁc
subclass of Intruder. We have assumed that the intruder knows no other
keys than the ones it is allowed as a proper principal. While decomposition
is uniform for all protocols, requiring a message and a key, the rule describing
the decomposition of a message by the intruder must be protocol-speciﬁc so
that the key for the protocol may be used.
The formats of the fake messages generalize those of the messages of the
protocol. Thus, their composition varies from protocol to protocol, but for
all it was organized so that a composition operation obtains the set of mes-
sages that can be constructed from all the old-components and one of the
new-components, which then becomes an old one.
For the Woo-Lam mutual authentication protocol there is a compose-msgs
rule that constructs messages of the following forms: (dummy, C), (C, dummy),
(A,C), (C,C ′), {N}(C >s-key) and {N,N ′}(C >s-key), where dummy is a
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Bits constant; A is a PrincipalId, C,C ′ are MsgComp’s that are not PrincipalId’s,
and N,N ′ are Nonce’s. There is also a compose-ids-msgs rule for the con-
struction of messages that are pairs of PrincipalId’s.
The intruder for this protocol is modelled by
class WooLamMA-Intruder |
special-fake-msgs : Set[ProtocolMsg],
compose-ids-prod : Bool,
authentication-attacks : Set[VictimInitIdNonceRespIdNonce],
key-attacks : Set[KeyInitIdNonceRespIdNonce] .
subclass WooLamMA-Intruder < Intruder .
subclass WooLamMA-Intruder < WooLamMA-Principal .
The fake messages constructed by compose-ids-msgs and those of the
form (A,C) are members of special-fake-msgs because their ﬁrst compo-
nent determines the principal to be impersonated as the sender. They are sent
by send-special-msg. The rest of the messages are members of fake-msgs.
For these there is no connection between a message and the impersonated
sender or targeted recipients. These are sent by send-msg.
4 Attacks
Woo and Lam propose in [11] the Principle of Full Information — every
outgoing encrypted message should include all the information the principal
has gathered so far in the authentication exchange. With messages that are
more speciﬁc to a particular authentication exchange run it is less likely that
an intruder could exploit them in compromising another run. Similarly, an
analogous principle can be used in the deﬁnition of the state of a principal of
the protocol. With states that are more speciﬁc to a particular run it is less
likely that an attack can go undetected.
Deﬁnition 4.1 Let σ and σ′ be states of a run of some principal, σ ≺ σ′ if
every component of σ is a component of σ′.
Deﬁnition 4.2 A sequence α of states of a run of a principal satisﬁes the
Principle of Full Information if n < n′ implies αn ≺ αn′, where αn is the n-th
state in α.
Lowe deﬁnes in [5] a series of increasingly stronger forms of authentication.
One of the strongest, and the one he considers most useful, is full agreement.
When the aim is to authenticate B to A,
Deﬁnition 4.3 A protocol guarantees to A full agreement with B on all the
atomic data items used in the run if whenever A, acting as initiator/responder,
completes the run of the protocol, apparently with B, then
(i) B has been previously running the protocol apparently with A,
(ii) B was acting as responder/initiator,
9
Rodr´ıguez
(iii) the two agents agree on all the atomic data for the protocol, and
(iv) each run of A corresponds to a unique run of B.
In the Woo-Lam mutual authentication protocol the authentication part
is completed before the end of the protocol. The authentication of A by B is
completed when B gets back in Message 5 the nonce it had sent A in Message
2, that is, when the run reaches state β2 (see Figure 4). If A has participated in
this run it should be in state α2 = initiator-runs? : o* B o# Nb m# Na.
o* B indicates that A has been running the protocol apparently with B. Since
A is in state α2 and B in state β2, run states for initiator and responder, re-
spectively, A and B agree on the roles they are playing. They also agree on
their nonces.
To prove full agreement we must still show that for each run of B there
corresponds a unique run of A. Consider a run of B apparently with A, and
suppose A has runs apparently with B in states αi and α
′
j. All states of a run
of A apparently with B contain B. As A initiates a run it creates exactly one
nonce. Let Na and Na′ be the nonces A has created for the runs in states αi
and α′j. A run may be in state αi only after having been in states α0, . . . , αi−1,
and likewise α′j must have been preceded by α
′
0, . . . , α
′
j−1. Since desired-runs
is a set, α0 = desired-runs : B = α
′
0, then there is some nonce N such
that α1 = started-runs? : o* B m# N = α
′
1. Since α1 ≺ αi and α′1 ≺ α′j
then Na = N = Na′. Thus, the fourth condition for full agreement holds.
Then a violation of the authentication of A by B is speciﬁed by
crl [authentication-attack-resp] :
[ Conf
< B : WooLamMA-Principal |
authenticated-ids : (o* A o# Na m# Nb) U AIds >
< A : WooLamMA-Principal |
initiator-runs? : IRs >
< I : WooLamMA-Intruder |
authentication-attacks : AAs > ]
=> [ Conf
< B : WooLamMA-Principal | >
< A : WooLamMA-Principal | >
< I : WooLamMA-Intruder |
authentication-attacks :
(responder i* A i# Na r* B r# Nb) U AAs > ]
if not (o* B o# Nb m# Na in IRs)
and not (responder i* A i# Na r* B r# Nb in AAs) .
Similar arguments can be made about the authentication of B by A, since
by the condition of get-1-send-2 (see page 7) at most one run ofB apparently
with A is allowed. This authentication is completed when A reaches α3. At
that step B should be in state β2. Thus, a violation of full agreement in this
authentication is detected when B is not in state β2.
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The key distributed by this protocol is generated by the server exclusively
for each run. We consider attacks where a principal accepts a key for which
this is not the case. This may happen when an old or a forged key is accepted.
A has accepted the key in state α3; B, in state β3. If session-keys does
not contain an element correctly identifying A and B as the communicating
partners, their nonces and their key, an attack has occurred.
5 State-Space Exploration
One of the approaches to the analysis of protocols is to model them as ﬁnite
state systems and exhaustively explore the state space, or for inﬁnite or very
large states spaces, some ﬁnite portion of practical interest, to verify that
some property holds for all states, or if otherwise, to obtain counterexamples.
Denker, Meseguer and Talcott demonstrate in [3] how to systematically explore
the state space of a concurrent system using Maude.
A system module is the speciﬁcation of a concurrent system. Its terms
represent states of that system, and its rules, the state transitions. The state
space can be explored by searching the computation tree.
Maude has a predeﬁned module META-LEVEL, which introduces sorts Module
and Term for the metarepresentation of modules and terms. At the metalevel
a module can be manipulated as data. In particular, META-LEVEL provides
the function meta-apply, which allows complete control in the application
of rules of a Maude module. An internal strategy in Maude is an operation
that controls the rewriting process. It must be an operation of a module that
extends META-LEVEL. We consider a strategy that searches a computation tree.
In general, from a given state more than one state transitions are possible.
A rewrite rule may represent many transitions. There may be several matches
between the left-hand side of a rule and some given term. Maude orders these
matches in some way. It is possible to specify a particular application of a
rule by specifying to meta-apply how many of the initial matches to discard
before applying the rule. When no more matches are possible the rule cannot
be applied.
If T is a Term representing some state(s) of a system, and L is the (quoted)
label of some rule, the children of T in a computation tree can be represented
by terms of the form step(L, K, T’), where K is the number of matches
discarded as the rule labelled by L was applied to obtain Term T’. The fact
that all matches have been exhausted and no rule can be applied is represented
by the term noStep.
A computation tree is then an ordered tree that can be determined by a
Module M specifying a system, a Term T representing the initial state, and a list
Ll of sort QidList representing rules for state transitions. If L L’ denotes
that L precedes L’ in Ll, sibling nodes can be lexicographically ordered as
follows.
step(L, K, T)  step(L’,K’,T’) ⇐⇒ L L’ ∨ (L = L’ ∧ K < K’).
11
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step(L, K, T)  noStep
Children nodes, including noStep, are of sort Step, with those of form
step(L, K, T) of subsort ProperStep. Paths are represented by terms of
sort Path and its subsort ProperPath, which have the following constructors.
Term is a subsort of ProperPath.
op _->_ : ProperPath Step -> Path .
op _->_ : ProperPath ProperStep -> ProperPath .
Thus, a Path is a Term followed by Step’s, and if not a ProperPath ending
with noStep.
Not all transitions are enabled at every state. While a list of (quoted)
labels determines the children of a node, all nodes need not have the same
list. One possible way of tailoring lists to nodes is with a mapping MoR from
Qid to QidList, of sort MapOfRules, so that the children of a step(L, K,
T) node are obtained by applying the rules in MoR[L]. A Qid noLabel is
associated with the root.
A computation tree is represented implicitly by a single Path, and a depth-
ﬁrst traversal of it, by a succession of Path’s in the corresponding order. Now
the purpose of the strategy under consideration is actually the examination
of computations speciﬁed by a module. Should this module be a speciﬁcation
of a protocol, such as those described in the previous sections, a computation
describes a possible scenario permitted by the speciﬁcation. More generally,
however, the purpose of the strategy being considered is to examine in breadth-
ﬁrst order the tree of computations for a system speciﬁed by a Maude module.
A bounded depth-ﬁrst traversal of a computation tree, say with bound D, can
be viewed as the visit of all nodes at depth D of a tree whose nodes at that
depth are computations of length D. Thus, the breadth-ﬁrst traversal of such
a tree can be implemented as successive bounded depth-ﬁrst traversals of the
computation tree, with incrementing bounds.
The bounded depth-ﬁrst succession of Path’s is given by three cases. If the
length of the Path P is less than the bound, and its last node is not noStep,
it is succeeded by a Path that extends P with the least child of its last node.
If the length of P is the bound, its last node is replaced with its next sibling.
If the last node of P is noStep, and the node N above it is not the root,
both of these nodes are replaced with the next sibling of N . The traversal has
ended when P is the root with child noStep, since this is the greatest of all
the children of the root.
Pruning would alter somewhat the succession just described. If by some
criterion the next path is determined to be prunable, it would be skipped.
Some criteria may depend not only on the last node or next to the last node
of the path, which in the above succession determine the next path, but on
some history-dependent property of the path. In this case we pair the single
Path implicitly representing the computation tree with the value of some data
type that gives that property for the current path. Such data type would have
12
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a prunable predicate.
We have considered it useful to be able to impose limits on the number of
times a rule may be applied in a Path. An element of sort LimQ has the form
[L : n, m], where L is a Qid, the label of a rule, and MachineInt’s n and m
give the number of times that rule has been applied and the limit. LimQl is
the sort for lists of LimQ’s. A LimitedPath pairs a Path and a LimQl, and is
deﬁned by
op _->_ : LimitedPath Step -> LimitedPath .
eq (P, Lq) -> noStep = (P -> noStep, Lq) .
eq (P, Lq) -> step(L, K, T)
= (P -> step(L, K, T), Lq + L) .
Lq + L takes into account the new application of the rule labelled by L.
We have been considering a traversal of a computation tree. The goal,
however, is the breadth-ﬁrst search of a tree of computations or Path’s for a
Path satisfying some property. Such a search is designed so that the sought
Path’s are characterized by the fact that their last node is obtained by the
application of a rule from a set of distinguished rules of the module specifying
the system. In our application to the analysis of protocols such rules are
usually the ones deﬁning the attacks, but in some cases others may be chosen.
Thus, the search takes as arguments the parameters deﬁning the compu-
tation tree and the sought Path’s. The ﬁrst consists of a Module M specifying
the concurrent system, a MapOfRules MoR specifying the state transitions,
which may be only some of those given in M, and a LimitedPath pairing a
ProperPath and a LimQl giving the label limits; the tree will be rooted on
the last node of the ProperPath. The search is designed to stop either when
a sought ProperPath is found or when some limit number of nodes have been
visited. The result returned provides the information necessary to resume the
search, if necessary, from the point in which it stopped.
6 Optimizations for Attack Searches
We have used two criteria to limit the size of the state space. We brieﬂy
describe them in this section.
All the rules in the speciﬁcation of a protocol, its intruder and the attacks
on it can be divided into three groups — rules that produce a message, rules
that consume a message, and rules that do neither. Suppose an attack is given
by
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T0 → S1 → · · · → Ss−1
→ Ss
→ Ss+1 → · · · → Sg−1
→ Sg
→ Sg+1
where Si = step(Li, Ki, Ti), and Ti gives the global state of the conﬁguration
of proper principals, servers, intruders and messages. Step Ss is the ﬁrst step
to produce a message, a step that is l steps from the end of the Path. The
message it produces is consumed at step Sg. Now consider the following Path.
T0 → S1 → · · · → Ss−1
→ Ss
→ S ′g
→ S ′s+1 → · · · → S ′g−1
→ S ′g+1
where S ′i = step(Li, K
′
i, T
′
i ). All the rules that were applied in the attack Path
can still be applied since none of the steps between Ss and Sg was consuming
the message produced at Ss and any rules that were enabled by Sg continue to
be enabled after its move up. An attack is a property of the local states of the
proper principals, which are aﬀected only by rules that specify the protocol.
Then at step S ′g+1 all proper principals will have received and sent the same
messages as before, and their states, which are sets, will be the same as in the
corresponding step of the attack Path.
Now assume that for any other split send-get pair remaining in the second
Path, whose send step must be less than l steps from the end of the Path,
moving up the get step would preserve the states all principals had after that
split send-get pair. Then pruning all Path’s with split send-get pairs will not
lose any attack.
This pruning is implicitly done by MapOfRule’s in which the value of a
label of a send rule is a list consisting only of labels of get rules. Furthermore,
the value of label of an intruder send rule should not include any intruder get
rule.
The second criterion used for pruning the computation tree was motivated
by the Path’s representing some known attacks on the protocols we studied,
which we present below.
A Path T -> step(L1, K1, T1) -> ... -> step(Ln, Kn, Tn) can be
speciﬁed by giving its initial Term and a list of “rule siblings” as follows t-r(T,
(L1 . K1); ... (Ln . Kn)), which is a term of sort TermRules.
Lowe’s attack[4] on the Needham-Schroeder public-key protocol[9] is given
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by
t-r ({ ’InitConf } ’TotalConfiguration ,
(’send-1 . 0); (’get-msg . 0); (’special-replay-msg . 2);
(’get-1-send-2 . 0); (’get-msg . 0); (’replay-msg . 3);
(’get-2-send-3 . 0); (’get-msg . 0); (’special-replay-msg . 6);
(’get-3 . 0); ’authentication-attack-resp . 0)
The initial conﬁguration consists of Alice, Bob and Trudy, the intruder,
with Alice wishing to communicate with Trudy. special-replay-msg is a
rule of NSPK-Intruder that given the FlaggedProtocolMsg (({Cl}public-key
P) ? Df) in msgs-by-others sends the message from A to B send {Cl}public-key
B, where A, B and P are PrincipalId’s and B is not the intruder.
The type ﬂaw attack on the Otway-Rees protocol presented in [1] is given
by
t-r ({ ’InitConf } ’TotalConfiguration ,
(’send-1 . 0); (’get-msg . 0); (’decompose-msg . 0);
(’compose-msgs . 0); (’compose-msgs . 0); (’send-msg . 7);
(’get-4 . 0); ’key-forgery-attack-init . 0)
The initial conﬁguration consists of Alice, Bob, Trudy and Server, with
Alice wishing to communicate with Bob.
One of the attacks on Woo and Lam’s protocol Π given in [11] is
t-r ({ ’InitConf } ’TotalConfiguration ,
(’fake-1 . 0); (’get-1-send-2 . 0); (’get-msg . 0);
(’send-dummy-msg . 0); (’get-3-send-4 . 0); (’get-msg . 0);
(’send-1 . 0); (’get-msg . 0); (’forge-4 . 0);
(’send-msg . 0); (’get-2-send-3 . 0); (’get-msg . 0);
(’replay-msg . 50); (’get-4-send-5 . 0); (’get-5 . 0);
’compromise-run . 0)
fake-1 and forge-4 are rules of WooLamPiIntruder. fake-1 sends the
message from A to B send A. If (N ? Df) is in msgs-by-others, forge-4
adds ((I, NKis) ? true) to fake-msgs.
Lowe’s attack [?] on Woo and Lam’s mutual authentication protocol is
given by
t-r ({ ’InitConf } ’TotalConfiguration ,
(’compose-ids-msgs . 0); (’send-special-msg . 13);
(’get-1-send-2 . 0); (’get-msg . 0); (’decompose-msg . 0);
(’compose-msgs . 0); (’send-dummy-msg . 3); (’get-3-send-4 . 0);
(’get-msg . 0); (’send-special-msg . 19); (’get-1-send-2 . 0);
(’get-msg . 0); (’send-dummy-msg . 3); (’get-3-send-4 . 1);
(’get-msg . 0); (’replay-msg . 19); (’get-5-send-6 . 0);
(’get-msg . 0); (’decompose-msg . 0); (’compose-msgs . 0);
(’send-msg . 34); (’get-7 . 0); ’key-attack-resp . 0)
The initial conﬁguration consists of Alice, Bob, Trudy and Server, and
none of the principals wishes to communicate with anyone. send-special-msg
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sends a fake message whose ﬁrst component is a WooLamMA-Principal imper-
sonating that principal.
Examining these attacks we note the distribution of the rules that appear
on them. The attack on the Needham-Schroeder public key protocol is of
length 11. One rule gets applied three times, another twice and the remaining
six get applied once. The Otway-Rees protocol attack is of length eight, with
one rule being applied twice, the others once. For the attack on Woo and
Lam’s Π protocol thirteen rules are used. One was applied four times, the
others once. The attack on Woo and Lam’s mutual authentication protocol
is of length 23, with one rule applied ﬁve times, six applied twice and six
applied once. These distributions motivated the parameterization of the search
strategy with limits on the number of times each rule may appear in a path.
We should point out that we have experimented very little in searching
for attacks, and up to now have sought only to ﬁnd some of the known at-
tacks. Search for other attacks should involve experimentation with other
initial conﬁgurations and parameters. However, with previous strategies all
these searches took longer, and in the case of the Woo-Lam mutual authenti-
cation protocol the attack was not found after hundreds of hours. So for now
we report that the attacks given above were found. The ﬁrst three were found
with depth-ﬁrst searches for a single bound. For the attack on the Needham-
Schroeder protocol the search with bound 11 took 2 seconds and visited 105
nodes. The attack on the Otway-Rees protocol was found with a bound of
8, visited 14 nodes and took 2 seconds. The attack on the Woo-LamΠ pro-
tocol was found with a bound of 16, visited 2129 nodes and took 23 seconds.
For the Woo-Lam mutual authentication protocol we did run a breadth-ﬁrst
search of the tree of computations from depth 1 to depth 17. The attack was
found in 13 hours 16 minutes after visiting 4,828,277 nodes. The same attack
is found with a bounded depth-ﬁrst search in 18 minutes 35 seconds, after
visiting 93,042 nodes. All searches were executed on a 333 MHz Sun Ultra 5
with 512 MB memory.
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